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RECENT DECISIONS
Insurance: Authority of Insurance Agent to Countermand
Notice of Cancellation Sent by the Carrier to the Insured-Defend-
ant-insurer, through its agent, issued a policy of insurance covering
the plaintiff-insured's automobile. Upon investigation, it came to de-
fendant's attention that plaintiff's son, whom the company considered
a bad risk, had on occasion used the automobile. The defendant wrote
its agent and informed him that it was cancelling the plaintiff's insur-
ance policy because of this. The insurer requested that the policy be
returned and stated that at such time, excess premiums would be re-
mitted to plaintiff. The defendant, not having received the policy as
requested, informed its agent that notice of cancellation was being sent
directly to plaintiff, which notice was thereafter received by the in-
sured. The plaintiff upon receipt of the notice of cancellation contacted
the agent, who also handled all plaintiff's other insurance business, and
inquired as to his standing in view of the carrier's notice. Plaintiff was
told by the agent that he should disregard the notice and that the in-
surance was still in effect. The automobile was subsequently damaged
and upon a claim made by the plaintiff through the agent, the defendant
denied liability. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the insur-
ance agent, who had disregarded notice of cancellation sent by the in-
surance company directly to the insured, could not revoke the cancella-
tion and reinstate the policy of insurance so as to make the insurer
liable under the insurance policy. Ingalls v. Commercial Insurance
Company of Newark, N.J.1
In analyzing any problem involving insurance, it becomes evident
that insurance, contrary to many other areas of the law, has been sub-
ject to governmental supervision since its inception. The close connec-
tion between the field of insurance and the public interest was evident
in legislation and judicial decisions of the late Middle Ages where the
insurance contract of today finds its origin.2 Bearing this point in mind,
modern-day courts have bent over backwards in construing and ap-
plying legislative enactments designed to protect the rights of the in-
sured who is, undoubtedly, often in an unequal bargaining position in
the absence of such safeguards.3 The decision of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in the Ingalls4 case thus may seem to many to be a reversal
of a trend founded on the history and nature of the insurance contract,
as well as, somewhat inequitable and unjust. Such a conclusion, how-
118 Wis. 2d 233, 118 N.W. 2d 178 (1962).
2 See Vance, The Early History of Insurance, 8 CoL. L. REv. (1908).
3 This is particularly true in view of the fact that insurance policies are drawn
up by the carriers and framed mainly in their interest.
4 Note 1 supra.
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ever, is not supported by an analysis of the court's decision and the
authorities cited therein.
In reaching its decision in Ingalls,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court
adopted the unanimous weight of authority.6 Courts which have faced
this problem previously have generally decided it on the question of
agency, putting the plaintiff to his proof in establishing the authority
of the agent to countermand the insurer's cancellation and ruling for
the defendant insurer in the absence of such proof. The Colonial7
and the Hartford8 cases are cited by Appleman5 in support of his state-
ment which provides that: "An agent of the insurer cannot revive a
canceled policy unless he has such authority in the specific case; and such
authority cannot be presumed."
The functional issue of the Ingalls"o case is clearly that of agency.
Although the fact situation gave rise to a case of first impression be-
fore the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the problem of the apparent au-
thority of a carrier's agent in dealing with an insured or prospective
insured has been raised in Wisconsin on numerous occasions. Recovery
has been granted to policy holders where an agent waived a policy con-
dition against additional insurance by oral statements."' The court has
also held that an agent has the power to modify insurance contracts
already in existence unless provided otherwise by the contract itself or
statute.'2 These cases refer to a Wisconsin statute 3 which provided that
one who acted on behalf of an insurance company was its agent. This
statute was repealed in 1955,14 but the court has enunciated its principle
as recently as 1957. In doing so, the court allowed recovery by an in-
sured against a carrier on the grounds that an agent's statements, pro-
viding for modification of the policy so as to include complete coverage
of property damage within the policy limits, estopped the defendant
from asserting absence of authority on the part of its agent.' 5 The
application of this doctrine, estoppel in pais,16 depends on the establish-
5 Ibid.
6 Williams v. Republic Insurance Company, 286 App. Div. 876, 141 N.Y.S.
2d 870 (1955); Colonial Assurance Co. v. National Fire Insurance Co., 110
Ill. App. 471 (1903); Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Reynolds, 36 Mich.
502 (1877).
7 Ibid.
s Ibid.
9 6 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcricF §4197, at 776 (1947).
10 Note 1 supra.
11 Schomer v. Hekla Fire Insurance Company, 50 Wis. 575, 7 N.W. 544 (1880).
12 Kiviniemi v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 201 Wis. 619, 231
N.W. 252 (1930). A provision in Ingalls provided that no modification of
the contract would be effective unless approved by the company.
13 WIs. STAT. §1977 (1878), which became Wis. STAT. §209.05 (1953).
'4 Wis. Laws 1955, ch. 600.
'5Jeske v. General Accident Fire and Life Insurance Corp., Ltd., 1 Wis. 2d
70, 83 N.W. 2d 167 (1957).1619 Am. JUR. Estoppel §34, at 634 (1939). "Equitable estoppel; or estoppel
in pais is the principle by which a party who knows or should know the
truth is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from denying, or
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ment of an agency relationship. However, it appears that the court's
decisions have stretched the law of agency to the utmost in dealing with
insurance contracts. This view of the law of agency taken by the courts
in handling litigation involving insurance contracts is in keeping with
the historical approach-public policy often demands that the equities
lie in favor of the insured vis-a-vis the carrier; but a line must be drawn
somewhere, for the integrity of contract is at stake.
In Ingalls,17 the plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract, an
express provision of which dealt with cancellation by either party upon
written notice. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the right
of cancellation of an insurance policy exists only by contract-a clause
to that regard being in the nature of a condition precedent.' s Defendant
gave notice to the insured in accordance with the unambiguous and un-
equivocal terms of the insurance contract. If an insurance policy is to
have legal standing as a contract, no rule of agency can be invoked to
countermand a cancellation without proof of the agent's authority to
countermand the principal's expressed intention.19 Thus when the
Ingalls2 ° case is viewed as giving rise to a basic question of contract,
the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court takes on new meaning
beyond the question of agency. The world of commerce, indeed all so-
ciety's paths of enterprise, rests on the law of contract-the right to
enforce a promise and the right to act pursuant to provisions attached
thereto. Applying this basic jurisprudential principle of the law of con-
tract to Ingalls,21 the plaintiff's case must fall in view of the power to
cancel, which was an express provision of the contract, and the pro-
vision which provided that no modification would be effective without
the carrier's approval?
The decision in the Ingalls 3 case, as already noted, may seem harsh,
but any hardship suffered by plaintiff points only to a seeming obliga-
tion owing to him from the defendant. The court, certainly, cannot
asserting the contrary of, any material fact which, by his words or conduct,
affirmative or negative, intentionally or through culpable negligence, he has
induced another, who was excusably ignorant of the true facts and who
had a right to rely upon such words or conduct, to believe and act upon
them thereby, as consequence reasonably to be anticipated, changing his posi-
tion in such a way that he would suffer injury if such denial or contrary
assertion was allowed."
17 Note 1 supra.
Is See Suennen v. Ervard, 254 Wis. 565, 36 N.W. 2d 685 (1949). Under the
Financial Responsibility Law of the State of Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ch. 344
(1961), automobile policies which must be certified as provided by §§344.31
and 344.32 can be cancelled only 10 days after notice of the cancellation is
filed in the office of the commissioner, policy provisions as to cancellation
notwithstanding. See Wis. STAT. §344.34 (1961).
19 See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §34 (1933), especially §34(c); see also RESTATE-
MENT, AGENCY §§39, 108(1) (1933).
20 Note 1 supra.
21 Ibid.
22 See text preceding, note 12 supra.
23 Note 1 supra.
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allow recovery in such a case where an apparent injustice is without
substantive basis. Any wrong suffered by plaintiff has been at the hands
of the agent, and any feelings of inequity which may accompany the
IngalIS2 4 decision will be mitigated in light of plaintiff's cause of action
against the agent.25
In conclusion, this decision, which limits an insurance agent's ap-
parent authority, rests on sound principles of agency and contract law.
PAUL J. CLULO
Charitable Immunity: Prior Abrogation of the Doctrine of Char-
itable Immunity Application to Churches-Plaintiff, a member of
defendant church, tripped over a permanently extended kneeler and was
injured. In a suit against the church, the court in re-examining the doc-
trine of immunity as applied to religious institutions, found the doctrine
of respondeat superior applicable to the defendant church.' t.
In Wisconsin prior to 1962, three. institutions enjoyed immunity
from the torts of their employees-governmental, charitable, and, re-
ligious. Of the five theories available on whic'h to, base this immunity,2
Wisconsin's rule was based on the inapplicability of respondeat superior
to these institutions. The immunity rule was first expressed in Morrison
v. Henke,3 . in which the defendant hospital was found immune from
liability for the negligence of its nurse because it derived no profit in
aiding the needy.4 This immunity was applied in .favor of the govern-
ment in Apfelbacher v. State,5 where it was pointed out. that to deny
the-application Qf .respondeat superior to the state.in its exerciseof a
24 Ibid.
25 See, Note, Liabilit, of an Insurance Agent for Malpractice, 11 IC6.q L. :REv.
184 (1962), and Note, Liability of an Insurance Agent in Procuring and
Maintaining Insurance for aii Owne7', 12 VAND. L. Riv. 839 (1939).
1 Widell v- Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121 N.W. 2d 249
(1963).
2Parks v. Norfhwestern University, 218 111. '381, 75 N.E. 991 (1905)- (The
trust fund theory); Cohen v. General Hosp. Soc., 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl.
435 (1931) (public policy theory); Taylor v. Protestant Hosp. Assn:, 85
Ohio St. -90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911) (inapplicability of respondeat superior);
Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 59 Idaho 3502, 82 P. 2d 849(1938) (waiver theory) ; University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564,
106 S.W. 219 (1907) (agencies of the government theory).
3165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W. 173 (1917), followed in Schumacher v. Evangelical
Deaconness Society, 218 Wis. 169, 260 N.W. 476 (1935).
4Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 170, 170 N.W. 173, 175 (1917): "The
maxim of respondeat superior is bottomed on this principle, that he who
expects to derive advantage from an act which is done by another for him
must answer for any injury which a third party may sustain from it."
5 160 Wis. 565, 575, 152 N.W. 144, 147 (1915): "The doctrine of respondeat
superior, while an ancient one in English law, is not one that rests upon
direct primary principles of justice. These principles require that the person
actually committing the wrong should alone respond in damages. The doctrine
rests rather upon secondary principles deduced from primary conceptions
of justice. It rests upon the idea that where an enterprise is carried on for
the financial benefit of a master, it is considered just that he should answer
for the tort of his servant in conducting it because he is deemed to profit
financially by its being carried on."
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